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Abstract 
Based on results from a national survey, this study examines how farm households say 
that they used (or would use) government transfers distributed in the form of direct fixed 
payments.  In  addition,  the  study  examines  what  factors  best  explain  farm  household 
decisions regarding how fixed payment proceeds are used. 
Keywords: direct payments, decoupled payments   1 
Introduction 
  Federal  government  policies  to  subsidize  farmers  were  initiated  in  the  United 
States more than sixty years ago during the Great Depression when world agricultural 
markets  had  collapsed  and  farmers  were  numerous  and  impoverished.  Current 
government  programs  continue  making  various  types  of  income  support  payments  to 
farmers.  The  fixed  payments  or  Production  Flexibility  Contract  (PFC)  payments 
introduced  with  the  FAIR  Act  in  1996  help  maintain  farm  income  in  a  manner  that 
proponents  argue  does  not  distort  farm-level  production  decisions  and  encourage 
overproduction. They believe that these payments generate only minimal distortions in 
resource allocation decisions and are thus an efficient way to transfer income to targeted 
recipients.   
  However,  these  “decoupled”  payments  have  been  the  focus  of  significant 
attention during the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) round of negotiations. The 
debate centered on the extent to which U.S. fixed payments (and similar payments in the 
European Union) are really decoupled from farm-level production decisions. While the 
U.S. fixed payment program was designed to be fully compliant with WTO obligations, a 
WTO panel has issued a mixed verdict in a dispute brought by Brazil challenging several 
types  of  U.S.  agricultural  support  measures,  including  direct  payments.  Specifically, 
opponents  argue  that  income  support  provided  to  U.S.  cotton  farmers  through  direct 
payments creates incentives to produce more cotton and thus suppresses world cotton 
prices.  
This study, based on data from a national survey of farm households, investigates 
further  how  farm  households  perceive  fixed  payments  and  is  intended  to  enrich  the 
existing  literature  on  the  efficiency  and  rationality  of  fixed  payments  as  a  means  of 
income transfer. This is accomplished via two specific objectives. The first is to examine 
what factors explain differences in how  farm households allocate (or  would allocate) 
fixed  payments  between  generalized  farm  and  household  categories.  The  second 
objective is to examine what factors explain differences in the specific farm (household) 
uses to which the funds are (or would be) allocated. Better understanding the factors that 
explain  how  households  choose  to  allocate  fixed  payments  provides  insights  into  the 
extent to which these payments can be considered decoupled.    2 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews recent theoretical and 
empirical work on the decoupling issue, especially the effect of decoupling on production 
decisions. In addition, literature that addresses farm household allocation and investment 
decisions  is  also  reviewed.  This  is  followed  by  sections  that  discuss  the  data  and 
econometric methods, empirical results, and conclusions and implications.  
 
Literature review 
  The effect of fixed payments on production decisions and market supply has been 
analyzed using various approaches. Many empirical studies have focused on analysis of 
the acreage and/or production response to the direct payments made to US wheat, feed 
grains,  cotton,  and  rice  producers  under  the  1996  FAIR  Act  (OECD,  2005).    These 
studies are based on the general notion that the impact on production from any type of 
government financial support for agriculture depends on the exact nature of the program 
through which the support is being provided as well as on the incentives that the program 
creates and the behavior of producers in response to those incentives. 
  Hennessy (1998) developed a neo-classical framework for the analysis of income 
support  policies  under  uncertainty.    Hennessy  found  that,  in  general,  government 
payments affect farmers’ risk aversion through wealth and/or insurance effects. Fixed 
payments  cause  a  wealth  effect  but  no  insurance  effect.  A  fixed  payment  affects  a 
farmer’s wealth and this change in wealth can affect risk attitudes.  If risk aversion is 
decreasing in wealth, then fixed payment should make farmers more willing to take on 
risk.  For example, they may be more willing to expand production by planting crops on 
land that would otherwise be viewed as too risky OECD (2001). 
  Makki,  Somwaru,  and  Vandeveer  (2004)  reviewed  empirical  studies  of  risk 
aversion among U.S. farmers. They note that, in general, these studies found evidence of 
risk aversion though the exact magnitude varied widely. With regard to fixed payments, 
Makki, Somwaru, and Vandeveer (2004) conclude that the resulting effects on production 
are likely to be small for several reasons. First, payments are, on average, low (less than 3 
percent) relative to the net worth of participants. While fixed payments might influence 
production through “risk effects,” changes in risk aversion could also be manifested in 
many other ways such as changes in input use or mix of outputs.  Further, despite the   3 
availability of fixed payments, surveys find that producers still use various tools – such as 
insurance, hedging, and management strategies – to reduce risk.  
Even if producers are not risk-averse, production decisions may be influenced by 
expectations  about  the  conditions  attached  to  future  payments.  For  example,  fixed 
payments may affect planting decisions if producers have reason to believe that there 
might be future updating of the area upon which payments are based OECD (2001). In 
such a case, producers might be reluctant to reallocate acreage from program crops to 
other  crops  or  to  idle  marginal  land  in  order  to  protect  their  eligibility  for  future 
payments.  For  there  to  be  a  link  between  current  payments  and  these  production 
decisions, producers would have to believe that current program provisions provide a 
good indicator of future program provisions. Goodwin and Mishra (2006) evaluated the 
effect of base updating on planting decisions. Their results do not exhibit a statistically 
significant effect on acreage allocations.  
  A production decision for a given year may be based on a variety of intertemporal 
considerations  (OECD,  2001;  Roe  et  al.,  2004).    Production  decisions  are  tied  to 
decisions about investments in productive assets.  Capital goods can be used at least 
partially  in  future  production  years.  This  means  that  production  in  a  given  year  is  a 
function of several inputs including the current level of capital, which depends on past 
investment decisions. The farmer must decide each year how much to produce and invest 
in the farm, taking into account that any additional capital will affect both current and 
future production.  
  If  capital  markets  are  perfectly  competitive,  the  production  and  investment 
decisions will be independent of consumption decisions. The level of optimal investment 
will be based on the rate of the return from the farm investment compared to market 
interest rates. Farmers adjust their consumption and investment decisions across time 
using capital markets to borrow or lend freely. In this scenario, fixed payments will not 
affect investment decisions, that is, fixed payments will be decoupled in both a static and 
a dynamic sense. 
  However, if capital markets are imperfect, then agricultural subsidy programs will 
not be decoupled in a dynamic sense, even if they are decoupled in a static sense (OECD, 
2001). When producers face capital constraints, the additional income generated from   4 
fixed  payments  will  allow  them  to  invest  more  in  farm  operations  out  of  earnings 
generated by the farm business (OECD, 2005). Based on this theory, Young and Westcott 
(2000) argue that if farmers have limited liquidity and/or face credit constraints, the cash 
flow and increased wealth provided by fixed payments may facilitate more production 
through increases in agricultural investments. Of course, some of the fixed payment may 
be allocated to consumption, savings, and non-farm investments, but, farm investment 
may also rise.  
  Collender  and  Morehart  (2004)  examine  the  extent  to  which  capital  market 
imperfections may affect farm investment and production. They find that imperfections 
do exist but they do not appear to influence aggregate investment. Though some farmers 
have limited liquidity or face credit constraints, any increased investment enabled by 
fixed payments would not have much effect on aggregate production. Further, the effect 
would likely be transitory. Farmers who cannot afford the investments required to attain 
and maintain efficiency, will soon be induced by competitive forces to relinquish control 
of their assets to unconstrained farm owners or managers. 
Mishra and Goodwin (2005) estimated acreage response models that incorporate 
market  prices,  fixed  payments  and  marketing  loan  payments.  They  also  attempted  to 
capture  the  indirect  effects  of  fixed  payments  on  acreage  response  through  farmers’ 
aversion to risk and capital constraints. They estimated their models not only at the farm 
level but also at the county-level because the farm-level data did not track individual 
farms over time. Findings based on both the farm-level and county-level data indicated 
that the effect of direct payments on acreage decisions was very small, though in some 
cases  statistically  significant.  These  results  are  similar  to  those  obtained  from  the 
aggregate model by Burfisher and Hopkins (2003).  Mishra and Goodwin (2005) also 
found that acreage decisions are not affected by changes in wealth, thus implying that any 
risk preference shifts caused by different levels of wealth do not appear to affect crop 
acreage.  This  is  in  contrast  to  other  findings  (e.g.,  Hennessy,  1998)  that  suggested 
important wealth effects on risk preferences and production.  
Burfisher and Hopkins (2003) suggest that fixed payments might affect the farm 
household’s labor-leisure choice. Ahearn et al. (2002) analyze the impact of government 
payments on off-farm labor force participation decisions and hours worked off the farm   5 
by farm operators. Their results indicate that government payments reduce the probability 
of working off the farm. However, the effect is relatively small. El-Osta, Mishra, and 
Ahern  (2004)  found  that  the  impact  of  direct  payments  on  on-farm  work  hours  was 
statistically significant but also small in magnitude.  Ahearn et al. (1993) determined that 
an increase in farm households’ incomes will cause a rise in consumption and living 
expenditures.    Mishra  and  Moreheart  (2001)  investigated  factors  that  affect  off-farm 
investment  by  farm  households.  Among  other  statistically  significant  variables, 
household net worth and farm size were positively related to off-farm investment. 
Goodwin  and  Mishra  (2006)  evaluated  farmers’  reported  allocations  of  direct 
payment receipts among farm and non-farm uses. Their results indicate that operators of 
larger farm are more likely to report significant on-farm usage of the funds received as 
direct payments. Operators that are highly leveraged are much more likely to allocate 
funds toward on-farm uses. This is consistent with the argument that direct payments may 
affect  the  production  of  credit-constrained  producers.  Older  farmers  and  farmers 
expecting  to  retire  in  the  near  future  are  much  less  likely  to  allocate  direct  payment 
receipts to on-farm uses. Wealthy farm operators are more likely to use direct payment 
receipts for on-farm purposes while highly risk-averse operators are less likely to allocate 
direct payments to the farm.  
 
Data and Methods 
  Our  analysis  is  conducted  using  individual  farm  data  collected  under  the 
Agriculture Resource Management Survey (ARMS) project by the National Agricultural 
Statistics Service (NASS) of the USDA. These data are collected annually by a survey of 
individual farmers. The ARMS data represent the USDA’s primary source of information 
about U.S. agricultural production conditions, marketing practices, resource use, and the 
economic well-being of farm households. 
We use data collected in the 2003 ARMS survey. This survey included several 
questions related to how the proceeds from direct payments either were allocated (for 
those who currently received direct payments) or would be allocated (for those who did 
not currently receive direct payments).  These questions were asked only in the 2003   6 
survey and thus, our analysis has the limitation of looking only at a single-period.  The 
results of preliminary analysis of responses are provided in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Stated Uses of Fixed Direct (Decoupled) Payments 
Use of Payments          Weighted Average    St. Deviation 
 
Entire Sample (n = 5,596) 
Used on Farm              65.11      396.23 
Used on Household            34.89      396.23 
Used on Farm Operating Costs          32.56      467.09 
Used on Farmland Rental and Purchase          9.13      213.25 
Used on Farm Capital Expenditures        12.18      273.33 
Used to Pay Down Farm Debt          11.24      252.29 
Used on Farm Living Expenditures        16.24      281.07 
Used to Build Household Cash Reserves         7.12      205.37 
Used in Non-farm Assets            7.66      211.99 
Used to Pay Down Non-farm Debt          3.87      142.62 
 
Sub-Sample (1) that Received Payments in 2003 (n = 2,017) 
Used on Farm              74.67      382.34 
Used on Household            25.33      382.34 
Used on Farm Operating Costs          43.31      326.02 
Used on Farmland Rental and Purchase        11.35      187.90 
Used on Farm Capital Expenditures          6.68      241.45 
Used to Pay Down Farm Debt          13.33      163.13 
Used on Farm Living Expenditures        15.48      229.03 
Used to Build Household Cash Reserves         3.62      189.23 
Used in Non-farm Assets            3.96      172.35 
Used to Pay Down Non-farm Debt          2.12      121.01 
 
Sub-Sample (2) that Did Not Receive Payments in 2003 (n = 3,579) 
Used on Farm              48.10      481.96 
Used on Household            51.90      481.96 
Used on Farm Operating Costs          24.16      442.71 
Used on Farmland Rental and Purchase          7.87      180.04 
Used on Farm Capital Expenditures        14.42      286.67 
Used to Pay Down Farm Debt          10.65      290.11 
Used on Farm Living Expenditures        21.36      315.67 
Used to Build Household Cash Reserves       12.09      284.46 
Used in Non-farm Assets          13.57      225.53 
Used to Pay Down Non-farm Debt          4.88      153.12 
 
The  empirical  analysis  was  estimated  in  two  parts.  The  first  part  utilizes 
multinomial logit procedures and examines factors that explain how households indicated 
they have (or would) allocate fixed payments between general farm and household uses.   7 
Goodwin and Mishra (2006) conducted a similar empirical analysis; however they only 
examined the responses of those who actually received direct payments in 2003. Our 
analysis includes both current recipients and non-recipients.  The entire sample of 5,596 
observations  is  divided  into  two  subsamples  (recipients  and  non-recipients)  and  the 
model is estimated.  The discrete dependent variable is based on results from a question 
that  asks  whether  the  farm  would  allocate  a  $10,000  fixed  payment  to  farm  uses, 
household uses, or both farm and household uses.  The latter is used as the base case for 
the multinominal logit model.  
  In  the  second  part,  a  censored  two-limit  tobit  model  is  employed  to  examine 
factors that explain allocations across specific farm and household uses. In the survey, 
respondents  could  choose  from  among  5  specific  allocations  for  farm  use  –  farm 
operating  costs  (excluding  the  rental  of  farmland),  farmland  rental,  farm  capital 
expenditures (excluding the purchase of farmland), farmland purchases, and farm debt 
payments. Respondents also chose from among 5 specific allocations for household uses 
-  family  living  expenditures  (food,  clothing,  appliances,  medical  care,  education, 
vacations, etc.), maintain a cash reserve for the household, non-farm financial assets (e.g. 
stocks, bonds, or other investments), non-farm real assets (e.g. non-farm real estate or 
home improvements), and non-farm debt payments. To simplify the analysis we merged 
the shares allocated to farmland rental and purchase, since both would indicate acreage 
expansion,  and  shares  allocated  to  non-farm  financial  and  real  assets,  which  together 
would represent allocation to all non-farm assets of any kind. 
  In both parts of the empirical analysis, any farm that is not classified as a family 
farm  was  excluded.    Family  farms  would  still  include  those  that  are  classified  as 
commercial,  limited-resource,  retirement,  residential/lifestyle  farms.  Thus,  our  sample 
includes  only  farms  that  are  closely  held  or  controlled  by  the  farm  operator  and 
household.  A  dummy  variable  identified  where  the  farm  was  located  within  the  9 
Economic Research Service (ERS) production regions and a dummy variable for farm 
typology based on the major commodity produced on the farm measured by value of 
production. 
  Other variables included in the empirical analysis are farm size (measured by total 
value of production), wealth (measured by net worth), financial leverage (measured by   8 
debt-to-asset ratio), rate of return on assets, farm tenure, and marketing strategies. In 
addition,  we  included  household  characteristics  such  as:    household  size  and  age 
demographics,  operator’s  gender,  operator’s  marital  status,  operator’s  age,  operator’s 
education level, whether or not the operator intended to retire prior to 2008, whether or 
not the operator or spouse were employed off the farm, and whether or not the operator or 
spouse were employed off the farm prior to starting the farm operation.  
Respondents  were  also  asked  whether  they  agree  or  disagree  that  non-farm 
investments  offer  higher  returns  than  farm  investments  and  if  non-farm  investments 
reduce the household’s overall financial risk. In addition, to measure risk preferences we 
constructed a proxy variable that is the ratio of total expenditures on insurance over total 
farm expenses. We hypothesize that more risk averse farms will tend to devote more of 
their total production expenditures to insurance. Definitions for the variables used in the 
analysis are presented in table 2. 
The ARMS survey applies complex stratified, multi-frame, probability-weighted, 
and  sometimes  multiple-phase,  sampling  methods.    These  sampling  methods  lead  to 
complications in estimating the efficiency of summary statistics.  When the empirical 
analysis involves maximum likelihood estimation techniques, the complications occur in 
estimating  the  standard  errors.  To  address  this  problem  a  delete-a-group  jacknife 
procedure was used (Dubman, 2000). We use the NASS version of the delete-a-group 
jacknife, where the sample is divided into 15 nearly equal and mutually exclusive parts. 
Fifteen  parameter  estimates,  called  “replicates”,  are  created.  One  of  the  15  parts  is 
eliminated, in turn, for each replicate estimate with replacement. Replicate weights are 




  The multinomial logit analysis of payment allocation was based upon 5,596 farms 
across the U.S. The model was additionally run separately on the two subsamples – those 
who received direct payments in 2003 (a sample of 2,017 farms), and those who did not 
receive  direct  payments  in  2003  but  answered  a  question  regarding  a  hypothetical 
$10,000 direct payment (a sample of 3,579 farms).   9 
Table.2 Description of the explanatory variables 
Variable     Description 
Farm Characteristics: 
FARMSIZE  total value of production in thousands U.S. dollars 
WEALTH  net worth in thousands U.S. dollars 
DEBTASSET  debt-to-asset ratio 
RROA  rate of return on assets (from farming) 
INS  proxy variable, constructed as the ratio of total expenditures on insurance over total farm 
expenses 
Farm Tenure (base=full tenant) 
FOWNER  =1 if full owner, 0 otherwise 
POWNER  =1 is partial owner, 0 otherwise 
Farm Type based on major commodity produced (base=OLIVE, other livestock) 
CG  =1 if cash grains (including wheat, corn, soybean, grain sorghum, and rice), 0 otherwise 
OFC  =1 if other field crops (tobacco, cotton, peanut), 0 otherwise  
HVC  =1 if high-value crops (fruits, tree nuts, vegetables, nursery and greenhouses), 0 otherwise 
BEEF    =1 if beef cattle, 0 otherwise 
POULT    =1 if poultry, 0 otherwise 
DAIRY    =1 if dairy, 0 otherwise 
Marketing Strategy  
PRODUCT  =1 if sold through forward contracts, 0 otherwise 
CONTRACT  =1 if sold through futures or options contracts, 0 otherwise 
MARKET  =1 if cold for cash, 0 otherwise 
Farm Operator/Spouse Characteristics 
HH_SIZE  number of persons in the household 
HH_SIZE18  number of persons who are 18 or younger 
HH_SIZE65  number of persons who are 65 or older 
OP_GEN  operator’s gender, =1 if male, 0 otherwise 
OP_AGE  operator’s age 
RETIRE  retirement plans, =1 if operator plans to retire during the next 5 years, 0 otherwise 
OP_OFF  =1 if operator is off-farm employed, 0 otherwise 
SP_OFF  =1 if spouse is off-farm employed, 0 otherwise 
OP_LSTR  operator’s livelihood strategy, =1 if operator worked at any off-farm job prior to becoming a 
farm operator, 0 otherwise 
SP_LSTR  spouse’s livelihood strategy, =1 if spouse worked at any off-farm job before farming, 0 
otherwise 
EDUC  operator’s education level, =10 if some high school or less, 12 if completed high school, 14 if 
some college, 16 if completed college, 18 if graduate school 
MARRIED  operator’s marital status, =1 if married, 0 otherwise 
NFRET  =1 if strongly agree or agree that non-farm investments offer a higher return than farm 
investments, 0 otherwise 
NFRISK  =1 if strongly agree or agree that non-farm investments reduce my family’s overall financial 
risk, 0 otherwise 
ERS Regions (Mississippi Portal region is used as a base) 
HEART  =1 if the farm is located in the Heartland region, 0 otherwise 
NORTHC  =1 if the farm is located in the Northern Crescent region, 0 otherwise 
NORTHGP  =1 if the farm is located in the Northern Great Plains region, 0 otherwise 
PGATE  =1 if the farm is located in the Prairie Gateway region, 0 otherwise 
EUPLAND  =1 if the farm is located in the Eastern Upland region, 0 otherwise 
SSBOARD  =1 if the farm is located in the Southern Seaboard region, 0 otherwise 
FRIM    =1 if the farm is located in the Fruitful Rim region, 0 otherwise 
BASINR =1 if the farm is located in the Basin and Range region, 0 otherwise 
______________________________________________________________________________________   10 
  The first objective was to examine what factors explain differences in how farm 
households  indicate  that  they  have  (or  would)  allocate  fixed  payments  between 
generalized farm and household categories. Results of this analysis are shown in table 3.  
A second objective was to examine what factors explain differences in the specific farm 
or  household  uses  to  which  fixed  payments  have  (or  would  be)  allocated.    Selected  
results from these models are shown in tables 4 and 5. 
For the entire sample and sub-sample 2, larger farms are more likely to allocate 
direct  payments  towards  household  uses  than  to  farm  uses,  though  the  likelihood 
estimates  are  very  small.    The  impact  of  wealth  is  more  ambiguous.    For  the  entire 
sample, wealthier households are more likely to allocate direct payments to farm uses and 
less likely to allocate them to household uses.  For sub-sample 2, wealthier households 
are more likely to allocate direct payments to either farm uses or household uses rather 
than  to  both  farm  and  household  uses  (the  base  case),  however  again  the  likelihood 
estimates  are  small.  Financial  leverage  plays  a  significant  role  in  explaining  the 
preference  of  households  to  allocate  direct  payments  to  on-farm  uses.  For  the  entire 
sample, and sub-sample 2, households with higher rates of return on farm assets are more 
likely  to  allocate  the  fixed  payment  to  farm  uses.    The  risk  aversion  proxy  was  not 
significant for any of the samples.  For the entire sample and sub-sample 2, if the farm 
operator is either a full or partial owner for the farm, he/she is less likely to invest direct 
payment proceeds only to farm uses.  
For the entire sample, farms that specialize in cash grain production are more 
likely to allocate the fixed payment toward farm uses than farms specializing in other 
livestock (the base case). For the entire sample and sub-sample 1, farms that specialize in 
other field crops (OFC) like tobacco, cotton, and peanuts are less likely to allocate the 
fixed payment solely to farm uses than to both farm and household uses (the base case). 
For  the  entire  sample,  larger  farm  households  are  less  likely  to  invest  fixed 
payment proceeds solely to the farm.  For the entire sample and sub-sample 1, households 
with more children under age 18 are less likely to allocate fixed payment proceeds solely 
for household uses. The opposite is true for sub-sample 2.  For the entire sample and sub-
sample 2, the more persons in the household who are age 65 or older prefer, the more 
likely that the household will allocate the fixed payment to both farm and household uses   11 
rather than solely to the farm or solely to the household.  For the entire sample and sub-
sample  1,  male  farm  operators  are  less  likely  to  allocate  fixed  payments  solely  to 
household uses.  For the entire sample and sub-sample 2, older operators are less likely to 
allocate fixed payments solely to the farm.  Also, those who intend to retire prior to 2008 
are less likely to allocate fixed payments solely to the farm and more likely to allocate the 
payments  solely  to  the  household.    For  the  entire  sample  and  sub-sample  2,  married 
operators  are  more  likely  to  allocate  fixed  payments  solely  to  household  uses.  
Surprisingly, for the entire sample and sub-sample 2, those who believe that non-farm 
investments offer higher returns than farm investments are actually less likely to allocate 
the fixed payment solely to household uses.  For the entire sample and sub-sample 1, 
those who believe that non-farm investments reduce household financial risk are less 
likely to invest direct payment proceeds solely in farm uses.  
In  the  tobit  analysis  the  same  model  was  run  for  each  specific  allocation 
individually  and  therefore,  we  have  8  two-limit  tobit  models.    Few  of  the  farm 
characteristics were significant in explaining which farmers would use payments to cover 
farm operating costs. For the entire sample, cash grain farmers are more likely to allocate 
the fixed payment for farm operating costs. Highly educated and married operators are 
less likely to use payments on farm operating costs.  
Full and partial owners are less likely to allocate fixed payments to land purchases 
are rental.  Large households, older operators and those who planned to retire prior to 
2008 are also less likely to use fixed payments to either purchase or rent additional land.   
For the entire sample, highly-leveraged farm households are less likely to spend 
fixed payments on farm capital expenditures. Older and more highly educated operators 
are more likely to allocate fixed payments to farm capital expenditures but those who 
intend to retire soon are less likely. 
For the entire sample  and sub-sample 2, operators who have higher insurance 
expenses relative to total expenses and those who are employed off-the farm are less 
likely to use fixed payments to decrease farm debt. Full and partial owners are generally 
more likely to use fixed payments to decrease farm debt. For the entire sample, larger 
households are more likely to use fixed payments to pay down farm debt.  
     12 
Table 3. Selected Parameter Estimates of Multinomial Logit Model: Determinants of 
Farm vs Household Allocation of Fixed Payments 
________________________________________________________________________ 
       
Entire sample            Subsample 1               Subsample 2 
            Farm        HH                  Farm              HH       Farm        HH 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept  –0.0146  –0.6439  –0.5083  –0.31  0.6818  –0.1791 
  (0.8269)  (0.9566)  (1.7515)  (4.1937)  (0.9673)  (0.9834) 
 
Farm Size  0.0000002  0.0000009***  0.0000006  0.0000001  0.0000001  0.0000008*** 
  (0.0000003)  (0.0000002)  (0.0000006)  (0.000002)  (0.0000004)  (0.0000002) 
 
Net Worth  0.0000003***  –0.0000009***  0.00000004  –0.00000009  0.0000003***  0.0000009*** 
  (0.00000009)  (0.0000006)  (0.0000001)  (0.0000007)  (0.0000001)  (0.0000003) 
 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio  1.6533***  –1.8313**  2.0862***  –3.0633  1.569***  –1.6501** 
  (0.3898)  (0.7874)  (0.862)  (4.0438)  (0.406)  (0.8349) 
 
RROA  0.00324*  0.00037  0.00028  –0.0016  0.0036***  0.0021 
  (0.0021)  (0.0061)  (0.0054)  (0.0142)  (0.001)  (0.0073) 
 
Insurance expenses  –0.3988  1.1774  –1.6147  –4.6302  –0.2464  1.5692 
  (0.7183)  (1.6811)  (3.5039)  (7.5234)  (0.9799)  (1.6598) 
 
Full Owner  –0.8092**  0.2799  0.0978  0.6319  –1.1296***  –0.1528 
  (0.3723)  (0.6564)  (0.628)  (1.7735)  (0.4295)  (0.7328) 
 
Partial Owner  –0.5646*  –0.4715  0.4584  0.5807  –1.0142**  –0.9176 
  (0.4049)  (0.6261)  (0.482)  (1.458)  (0.4952)  (0.7464) 
 
Cash Grain  0.6627***  –0.0768  –0.499  –0.272  0.0614  –0.183 
  (0.178)  (0.496)  (0.639)  (1.926)  (0.648)  (0.836) 
 
Other Field Crops  –0.2084*  0.4291  –0.9114*  –0.567  –0.2629  0.3682 
  (0.2144)  (0.2853)  (0.6675)  (1.7384)  (0.267)  (0.297) 
 
Household Size  –0.102*  0.0689  –0.1268  0.1401  –0.0713  0.0637 
  (0.073)  (0.055)  (0.1447)  (0.419)  (0.0789)  (0.0501) 
 
Household Size   –0.0217  –0.4107**  0.1262  –1.142*  –0.1195  0.377**   
(18 and younger)  (0.1021)  (0.2153)  (0.227)  (0.817)  (0.1241)  (0.224) 
 
Household Size  –0.548***  –1.341***  0.8852  –0.4443  –0.8378***  –1.4389*** 
(65 or older)  (0.215)  (0.403)  (2.088)  (12.502)  (0.3057)  (0.4069) 
 
Operator’s Gender  –0.0425  –0.6327**  0.8524  –2.768***  –0.1895  –0.4502 
  (0.2169)  (0.3235)  (0.775)  (1.049)  (0.2102)  (0.3542) 
 
Operator’s Age  –0.0066*  –0.0051  –0.011  –0.003  –0.0085**  –0.0059 
  (0.0044)  (0.0107)  (0.012)  (0.0460  (0.0059)  (0.011) 
 
Retirement Plans  –0.317***  0.4927***  0.3015  0.2629  –0.5643***  0.4955** 
  (0.128)  (0.228)  (0.419)  (1.173)  (0.1933)  (0.214) 
 
Operator’s Marital  0.2042  0.5656***  –0.024  0.3531  0.2074  0.5989*** 
Status  (0.238)  (0.208)  (0.405)  (1.258)  (0.269)  (0.2243) 
 
NFRET  –0.086  –0.349*  0.3175  –0.4853  –0.161  –0.4339* 
  (0.158)  (0.231)  (0.3302)  (0.78340  (0.2220  (0.2848) 
 
NRISK  –0.3894**  –0.2664*  –0.0789  –0.3255  –0.3637**  0.0693 
  (0.2079)  (0.1742)  (0.3299)  (0.715)  (0.2121)  (0.261) 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 
significance, respectively.   13 
 
Table  4.  Selected  Parameter  Estimates  of  Two-Limit  Tobit  Model:  Determinants  of 
Specific Farm Uses of Fixed Payments 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
       
  Entire   Subsample 1  Subsample 2  Entire   Subsample 1  Subsample 2 
  Sample      Sample 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
      Farm Operating Costs 
 
Intercept  94.034  0.20611  121.567  Operator’s  –5.7462**  –2.5849  –7.2328** 
  (80.41)  (93.885)  (102.775)  Education Level  (3.245)  (3.2161)  (4.0346) 
 
Farm Size  0.0026  0.0013  0.00162  Operator’s  –44.844*** –2.2464  –52.904*** 
  (0.0035)  (0.0065)  (0.0051)  Marital Status  (15.403)  (15.684)  (20.574) 
 
Cash Grain  78.338***  52.4163  –1.47515  σ  157.095  109.892  165.295 
  (21.87)  (73.946)  (35.862)  Sample Size  5177  1847  3330 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
      Land Purchases and Rental 
 
Intercept   –20.736  100.597*  –44.5004  Operator’s Age  –1.4646**  –0.7512  –1.6657* 
  (95.527)  (65.734)  (134.985)    (0.7888)  (0.6154)  (1.2065) 
 
Full Owner   –83.903*** –64.076*** –91.271***  Retirement Plans  –23.429*  35.2732  –57.118** 
  (22.475)  (22.817)  (38.646)    (17.917)  (27.125)  (27.335) 
 
Partial Owner  –41.449**  –29.079*** –44.47  Southern Seaboard  –40.277**  28.5796  –59.049*** 
  (19.208)  (10.259)  (37.6))    (18.971)  (48.998)  (22.8) 
 
Household Size  –5.9618*  –4.7799*  –6.5734  σ  152.211  76.2312  174.311 
  (3.9788)  (3.7217)  (5.217)  Sample Size  5168  1840  3328 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       
      Farm Capital Expenditures 
 
Intercept   –331.92*** –359.39  –355.47  Operator’s Age  1.06551**  0.57596**  1.35065** 
  (51.764)  (120.59)  (69.537)    (0.5704)  (0.8187)  (0.6616) 
 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio  –139.16*** –42.993  –166.69  Retirement Plans  –36.893**  –7.3981  –40.687** 
  (37.366)  (38.478)  (48.101)    (16.816)  (22.68)  (21.284) 
 
Other Field Crops  –22.763  50.5122*  –27.059*  Operator’s  11.3902*** 8.70869**  11.5792***
  (27.271)  (33.64)  (29.064)  Education Level  (4.038)  (4.0102)  (4.8079) 
 
Operator’s Gender  –11.7334  81.4452*  –16.681  σ   157.802  96.8364  165.194 
  (22.4209)  (53.519)  (27.032)  Sample Size  5172  1842  3330 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
      Paying Farm Debt 
 
Intercept   –267.49*** –200.73  –344.16***  Household Size   13.423***  2.4069  15.7101 
  (66.456)  (71.212)  (90.378)    (3.851)  (4.197)  (4.2512) 
 
Insurance Expenses  –165.91*  35.3106  –225.18***  Operator’s Age  –0.577  –0.771  –0.4025 
  (107.65)  (353.07)  (111.99)    (0.415)  (0.413)  (0.5413) 
 
Full Owner  53.668**  3.37444  88.8307*  Operator’s Off-Farm  35.784**  –2.278  54.3982*** 
  (23.09)  (18.392)  (57.728)  Employment  (20.36)  (14.65)  (18.537) 
 
Partial Owner  91.024***  40.752***  125.344**  σ   141.176  101.152  152.429 
  (28.98)  (15.54)  (67.321)  Sample Size  5177  1846  3331 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 
significance, respectively.   14 
Results for selected household uses are shown in table 5.  For the entire sample, 
full owners and operators who believe that non-farm investments offer higher returns 
than  on-farm  investments  are  more  likely  to  use  fixed  payments  for  family  living 
expenses.  Among  those  who  already  receive  fixed  payments  (sub-sample  1)  larger 
households are more likely to use fixed payments for family living expenses. For the 
entire sample and sub-sample 2, operators who worked off the farm prior to beginning 
their farming operations are less likely to use fixed payments for family living expenses. 
Highly-leveraged  farm  households  are  less  likely  to  use  fixed  payments  to 
increase  cash  reserves.  Operators  who  believe  that  non-farm  investments  reduce 
household financial risk are more likely to use fixed payments to build cash reserves. For 
the entire sample and sub-sample 2, larger households, male farm operators and those 
who intend to retire soon are more likely to use fixed payments to build cash reserves.  
For the entire sample, more educated farmers are less likely to use fixed payments to 
build cash reserves. 
For the entire sample and sub-sample 2, farmers who intend to retire soon and 
those who worked off the farm prior to beginning their farm operation are more likely to 
invest fixed payment proceeds in non-farm assets.  For sub-sample 1, full owners are less 
likely to use fixed payments to invest in non-farm assets while those who are employed 
off the farm and those who believe that non-farm investments reduce household financial 
risk are more likely to invest fixed payment proceeds in non-farm assets.  For sub-sample 
2, partial owners are more likely to use fixed payments to purchase non-farm assets. 
For the entire sample and sub-sample 2, larger households, households with more 
children under age 18, and households where the farm operator also works off the farm 
are more likely to use fixed payments to pay off non-farm debt. Operators who believe 
that non-farm assets offer higher returns than farm assets are less likely to use fixed 
payments to pay off non-farm debt.  For sub-sample 1, households with higher insurance 
expenses relative to total farm operating expenses and those with more individuals age 65 
or older are less likely to use fixed payments to pay off non-farm debt. 
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Table 5. Selected Parameter Estimates of Two-Limit Tobit Model: Determinants of 
Specific Household Uses of Fixed Payments 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
       
  Entire   Subsample 1  Subsample 2  Entire   Subsample 1  Subsample 2 
  Sample      Sample 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
      Family Living Expenses 
 
Intercept  117.709**  137.061  110.189  Operator’s   –25.785*  –42.164  –25.671* 
  (61.247)  (211.62)  (68.264)  Livelihood Strategy  (15.676)  (40.903)  (17.534) 
 
Full Owner  40.3221*  6.74285  45.9023  NFRET  20.1206*  7.70571  26.0827 
  (24.987)  (39.172)  (29.295)    (15.216)  (45.155)  (16.641) 
 
Household Size  1.97152  35.2691**  –2.4853  σ  148.806  210.801  139.669 
  (4.8771)  (16.101)  (5.5676)  Sample Size  5230  1871  3359 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
      Cash Reserve 
 
Intercept   –76.513**  –85.769  –80.574*  Retirement Plans  41.3809*** 0.04711  49.723*** 
  (39.881)  (110.88)  (49.149)    (8.8635)  (19.584)  (9.071) 
 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio  –96.807*** –205.51*** –84.754***  Operator’s   –2.5174*  1.2295  –1.913 
  (23.789)  (62.803)  (24.761)  Education Level  (1.9127)  (3.241)  (2.202) 
 
Household Size  4.96569**  –5.5929  5.25541*  NFRISK  35.7389*** 28.297*  34.716*** 
  (2.6024)  (11.979)  (2.4891)    (6.8827)  (19.44)  (6.832) 
 
Operator’s Gender  25.6081**  3.95139  28.7017**  σ  110.135  94.1277  109.622 
  (14.228)  (44.389)  (13.528)  Sample Size  5227  1871  3356 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       
      Non-Farm Assets 
 
Intercept   –308.69*** –112.08  348.955***  Operator’s Off-farm  –4.8883  27.1084*  –10.302 
  (95.191)  (166.72)  (97.926)  Employment  (15.701)  (19.619)  (18.382) 
 
Full Owner  20.2432  –67.659*  44.3359  Operator’s   35.4195*  –31.368  45.707** 
  (28.477)  (42.994)  (37.262)  Livelihood Strategy  (22.718)  (29.42)  (25.06) 
 
Partial Owner  32.9772  –30.573  61.5276**  NFRISK  0.03496  57.1783**  –7.9451
  (27.908)  (41.302)  (35.262)    (25.519)  (29.888)  (26.594) 
 
Retirement Plans  27.0222*  –25.445  36.4387**  σ   171.759  126.253  171.781 
  (19.271)  (35.074)  (20.807)  Sample Size  5227  1871  3356 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
      Paying Non-Farm Debt 
 
Intercept   –356.47**  –504.29  –383.23***  Household Size   47.892  –563.34*** 52.8774 
  (153.17)  (510.21)  (113.68)  (65 and older)  (42.892)  (164.88)  (42.174) 
 
Insurance Expenses  –120.41  –228.49*  –111.07  Operator’s Off-farm  65.718***  –11.342  78.6019*** 
  (135.75)  (175.01)  (142.41)  Employment  (24.71)  (27.844)  (30.166) 
 
Household Size  11.6209**  6.19065  10.1781*  NFRET  –50.64**  7.1184  –61.478*** 
  (5.8183)  (9.4124)  (6.7222)    (26.52)  (29.73)  (31.754) 
 
Household Size  23.2643**  6.3452  28.4406**  σ   162.465  109.564  163.886 
(18 and younger)  (11.016)  (19.75)  (12.726)  Sample Size  5231  1871  3360 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 
significance, respectively. 
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Discussion and conclusions 
The objective of our analysis was to determine how farm households use (or would use) 
fixed payments and to determine factors that explain such behavior. Unlike Goodwin and 
Mishra (2006), we used data for both current fixed payment recipients and non-recipients 
and estimated the allocation of payments to specific uses.  
Based on the data available from the 2003 ARMS survey significant empirical 
results were obtained that can be utilized to consider the extent to which U.S. fixed direct 
payments may cause distortions in production. Critics argue that these payments can alter 
production  decisions  because  payments  increase  farm  operators’  income,  and  the 
expectation of fixed, future payments increases their wealth. Previous research concluded 
that though fixed payments can provide an incentive to increase farm production, they 
likely have minimal links to farm production levels.   
  Fixed  payment  recipients  can  allocate  the  funds  received  over  a  wide 
selection  of  alternatives.  Our  empirical  results  generally  support  previous  empirical 
findings  that  fixed  payments  are  unlikely  to  have  a  significantly  increase  production 
through income or wealth effects. We analyzed various factors that explain household 
decisions regarding whether to allocate direct payments to generalized farm or household 
uses.  We also analyzed various factors that explain household decisions to allocate direct 
payments to specific farm and household uses.    17 
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